

A Critical Study of Electioneering Strategies of *Jamaat-e-Islami* Pakistan and Its Impacts: 1970-2008

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Abstract

The Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP) is one of the leading political parties of Pakistan deeply rooted in an Islamic ideology and it exercises deep influence in the political system. The arrest of Jamaat's leaders in 1950 forced the party to participate in active politics. This study focuses on Jamaat's election strategies of alliance politics, solo flight and boycott of elections and overall impacts upon JIP electoral politics. Jamaat-e-Islami enjoys great popularity across the country due to its Islamic ideology and social services, yet the party failed to translate its popularity into power of ballot, despite taking strong political stances. The party's policy to attract the voters on religious and sociological issues has been analyzed in the light of Sociological Theory. The voting behavior to support the parties that match their religious, cultural and social needs, as prescribed in Sociological Theory, has been exposed with the historical study of the Jamaat's electoral politics. The primary data is collected by conducting interviews of political activists, and secondary sources that discussed the electoral politics in Pakistan. Election results have been assessed to know the causes of failure or success of Jamaat. The study applies both qualitative and quantitative methods to a scholarly study of electoral politics of Jamaat.

Key Words: Jamaat-e-Islami, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, Alliance Politics, Electoral Politics

Introduction

The Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (hitherto written as Jamaat), founded in 1941, is considered the largest Islamic party in Pakistan in terms of its influence. Basically, the Party aimed at implementation of Shariah in Pakistan by assuming power through peaceful and democratic means. The Jamaat was highly attached with its program and mission. Democratic ways like elections were considered as the tools to approach the program. For establishing an Islamic State of Pakistan, the Jamaat circles had divergent views regarding the means to be adopted. A minority of Jamaat's members felt that engaging in electoral politics within the existing political system of the state of Pakistan would take the party away from its goal.¹ Modudi tried to convince the minority faction that political activity was crucial. So, Jamaat preferred to participate in politics in order to gain its goal of making Pakistan an Islamic State by reforming the individuals as well as society overall. Jamaat has been participating in politics continuously but its performance in the elections has not been appreciable.² Jamaat failed to draw the attention of the people through its message and political campaigning, though the party has been instrumental in formation of alliances, which advocating the cause of Islam, support for Islamization etc. However, it is a matter of concern that still the Jamaat has failed to gain substantial electoral mileage to come to power.³ The purpose of study is to discuss and evaluate the different electoral strategies such as boycott of elections, strategy of solo flight and politics of alliance. The purpose is also to evaluate the consequences.

The Elections and Participation of Jamaat

Initially, Jamaat showed indifferent attitude towards practical politics. From 1941 to 1947 Jamaat could not actively participate in political activities as it was busy to build its organizational muscle. The Jamaat contested the first ever elections in 1951, the elections for Legislative Assembly of Punjab province. Jamaat supported candidates of Azad Pakistan Party. Jamaat expressed support for 52 candidates but was able to bag about 200,000 votes. The impression was that due to alliance politics with the Azad Pakistan Party, Jamaat secured only 2 percent of total votes and got one seat. The

NWFP Legislative Assembly elections were held in December 1951. Jamaat fielded three candidates and it was minimum number of candidates fielded by any party. Jamaat failed to win a seat out of total 85 seats, though 13 independent candidates succeeded.

Possible reasons for the dismal performance in Punjab, one was the poor campaigning of the party's program, the second was that the people had no interest in the message and program of the party, along with displeasure of the central and provincial governments as well.⁴ The pro-government clerics bombarded the leadership of party with continuous outbreak of Islamic fatwas. The party's newspapers were outlawed, magazines Kawsar, Tasneem and Qasid were deprived of effective campaign for the party. In contrast to the pro-Muslim League, the ruling party's papers in the province attacked and discredited the Jamaat. The allegations were leveled that Jamaat opposed the idea of creation of Pakistan.⁵ The failure in elections was also due to Jamaat's involvement in the activities other than the electoral. The participation and effect of Jamaat in the anti-Ahmdi Movement, constitutional struggle and the ideological and religious matters were enough to deviate the party's attention from elections. It did not let Jamaat to concentrate its efforts only on the electoral politics.

Another of provincial legislative elections in Pakistan were held in East Bengal in 1954. The ideology of Jamaat namely the superiority of Islamic law over all other constitutional system was adopted by the ruling party. The stress on Islam was the slogan of ruling Muslim League so Jamaat was not harvesting it at least in East Pakistan. It was undoubtedly lower capacity and volume of Jamaat in East Bengal at that time. Jamaat was altogether absent in the whole scene of elections in East Bengal.

Jamaat in the politics of Pakistan has been playing its active role in fall of various governments. In 1950s it added its voice to the criticism against Prime Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. On supporting SEATO and CENTO he was labeled as danger for the Islamic world and a lackey of neo-imperialists. JI's voice joined with point of view of leftists. Ultimately,

Suhrawardy was deserted by his supporters and his government was dismissed.⁶ It also assaulted other governments till 1958.⁷ The highest point of Jamaat's electoral success came in 1958 in Karachi municipal corporation elections. Here 19 of 23 Jamaat candidates won seats. In this municipality, Jamaat formed more than a quarter of the council. Over the years, the JI has performed better at the local and provincial levels than the national level. It has won nine prominent mayoral positions and been part of two governing coalitions at the federal level.⁸

Under the martial law of 1958, all the political parties were banned. After the lift of the ban, Jammat revived its activities and got wider public acceptance due to its welfare service and propagation of the ideology through pulpit. There held elections under autocratic rule in 1962 where eighty thousand basic democrats elected 150 members of the National Assembly, mostly belonged to defunct political parties. The Republican and Muslim League performed well, while Jamaat put up poor political show .On 6th January 1964, Government banned the Jamaat and arrested Syed Modudi along with his companions.⁹ The ban was imposed on the charge that the party was actively engaged in public agitations in both Provinces. The ban was lifted after the verdict of the court in favor of the Jamaat. On 2 January 1965, there held first Presidential elections in Pakistan. Jamaat joined the Combined Opposition Parties and hence sided with Fatima Jinnah. However, fingers were raised within Jamaat as Fatima Jinnah being a woman candidate. Nevertheless Jamaat declared its full support for Miss Jinnah. The party's support for Fatima Jinnah showed it as a progressive political party.

Soon after Presidential elections, the indirect elections for National and Provincial assemblies were held on 21 March 1965. In COP there were two views about the participation in elections. Jamaat was supporting the boycott.¹⁰ It was argued that no one could win under such a system as made by Ayub regime.¹¹

Jamaat has been in the arena of elections since 1951. Being an ideological and well-organized religious party there were many prospects of its success in the

electoral field. However, the party failed to assert its political position through winning seats. The party did not take the defeat to heart rather, Molana Modudi thought that elections helped in spreading the manifesto of Jamaat across the length and breadth of the country and consolidated the social base of Jamaat. The failure in the elections made the leadership of Jamaat realize that the party had to model itself on the pattern of other political parties through its religio-political authority.¹²

Solo Flight Strategy

Elections 1970

First ever-general elections with direct votes were held in 1970, with which there started a new era of parliamentary type of government. There were 24 political parties contesting the election which seemed capable to make an impact on the masses. The Jamaat-e-Islami contested the election vigorously by claiming that it was the only party that had its roots at the grassroots level in the both wings of Pakistan. This claim was justified as the party had large following committed to its ideology. However, the Islamic ideology could not become a popular slogan, as it was evident from the results of elections. The results justified the view that the call for Islamic system in Pakistan had lost its appeal.

Despite all this, JIP was only the religio-political party in Pakistan which had its organizational footing and disciplinary muscle. Though Jamaat ran a very organized electoral campaign, yet it failed to achieve desired results in both the wings.

When the situation in the East Pakistan was intensified, Jamaat came forward as the defender of ideology of Pakistan. Syed Modudi strongly opposed the demand of renaming East Pakistan as Bangladesh. However, Jamaat supported to restore the 1956 constitution as the future constitution of Pakistan, the idea was opposed by AL and PPP.¹³ In the electoral campaign, restrictions were imposed on the Jamaat. Khurram Jah Murad tells that Jamaat was protesting against the Six Points formula and side by side supporting the demands of Bengalis mentioned lukewarmly. Jamaat claimed

that it was neither a racist nationalist party nor it could deny legitimate rights. Jamaat justified its stance that the whole of West Pakistan was not responsible for denying the just rights of the people of East Pakistan, as perceived by the Bengalis. Jamaat claimed that only a minority group was adopting undemocratic measures to suppress the voice of the people of East Pakistan.

To mobilize public, Syed Modudi toured the country and ran the election campaign as new leader of Pakistan in the offing. The party fielded 151 candidates for the National Assembly.¹⁴ Jamaat bagged four National Assembly seats out of one fifty seats that it contested; two from Sindh, one from Punjab and one from NWFP and secured only six percent of the votes polled. In the provinces, Jamaat won three seats from West Pakistan and one seat from East Pakistan. From West Pakistan, it bagged one seat each from Punjab, Sindh and NWFP.¹⁵ From NW 131 Karachi 4 Mahmood Azam Farooqi of Jamaat won the National Assembly seat. However, one thing went into the credit of the party that it was only party in the system that had secured votes equal to the ratio of both parts of the country.

The results of elections showed that Jamaat emerged as the third majority party at the center, following Awami League and PPP. It also emerged as the second largest party in East Pakistan in terms of bagging the number of votes. It had secured 973550 from the constituencies all over East Paksitan. Awami League had got 11942543 votes in National Assembly elections from East Pakistan.¹⁶

There was neck-to-neck contest on different seats between Qazi Hussain Ahmad as the candidate of Jamaat contested for National Assembly seat (NW Peshawar1) from Peshawar. He lost election to Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, the president of PML-Qayum. Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao of PPP, Arbab Sikandar Khan Khaleel of NAP-Wali were other prominent candidates. From a National Assembly seat (NW 9) Molana Gohar Rehman of Jamaat contested Nawabzada Amir Khan Hoti, former minister of West

Pakistan during Ayub period and elder brother of Abdul Ghafoor Hoti. Molana Gohar belonged to middle class. PPP candidate won the seat.¹⁷

In NWFP, Jamaat got major electoral gains from Dir constituency. For the National Assembly seat, Jamaat got 14187 votes and won. QML got 12728 votes and stood second. From the provincial seats, Jamaat won one seat that was Dir I, bagging 5404 votes whereas JUI stood second with 1498 votes. From Dir II, JI got 5249 votes but did not win.¹⁸

There were certain weaknesses in the ideological framework of Jamaat, which alienated the voters. Moreover, Jamaat's programme showed least concern to highlight the problems of folks, which resulted in loss of electoral public support. In contrast to Jamaat, the leaders of Iranian Islamic revolution had fully focused the problems faced by common people, which resulted in providing great public support. Dr. Ali Shariati, an ideologue of the Iranian Revolution, emphasizing on the importance of public wrote: "Throughout the Quran address being made to al-nas, i.e. the people, the Prophet is sent to al-nas, he addresses himself to al-nas, it is al-nas who are accountable for their deeds, al-nas are the basic factor in decline—in short, the whole responsibility for society and history is borne by al-nas. Islam recognizes the masses as the basis, the fundamental and conscious factor in determining history and society."¹⁹

Thus neglecting the problems of masses and pursuing propagandist approach gave the impression that Jamaat was in favor of status-co, which led to the party's defeat in the elections of 1970, despite presence of its large following in both the wings and despite Jamaat's excellent organization and party discipline.

Jamaat also realized it and tried to examine its weaknesses so that the party might reform its program and revisit strategies regarding its electoral politics. After electoral defeat, Molana Modudi, the ideologue of Jamaat, revisited the political strategy and evolved a new line of action, emphasizing the need that the party programme should be directed towards the weal and welfare of the impoverished and grief stricken masses in the villages and the slums. There

should be more focus on doing practical work for the masses than raising mere slogans.

Vali Nasr has maintained referring to the statement of the wife of Syed Modudi that after Jamaat suffered a defeat at the polls in 1970, he abandoned the concept of 'holy community'. In a complete reversal of his outlook in the mid 1950s, epitomized perhaps best by his attitude at Machi Goth, he concluded that the Jamaat had devoted ample time and energy to win elections without yielding political power. In 1972, he expressed his dissatisfaction to his wife that the Jamaat was no longer up to his standards. If he had the vigor, he would have started all over again.²⁰

Election 1993

For the elections 1993, Jamaat had two choices; to contest the elections in the formed alliance or as an individual party. Jamaat was ambivalent regarding its alliance with IJI. It also refused to make alliance with Pakistan Peoples' Party. Leaving the politics of alliance aside, the Jamaat adopted solo flight strategy forging coalition with the likeminded groups and smaller religious and social organizations. Jamaat left the politics of alliance with the larger parties but did not leave the idea of having the support of smaller parties and groups.

Internal Motives for Solo Flight in 1993

The party's leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, devised a new strategy to broaden its appeal to the 'Islamic Vote'. To that end, he launched a new alliance, Pakistan Islamic Front, PIF, and contested the 1993 elections under this name. The party also changed the conventional style of political campaign that pivoted around the leadership charisma. Qazi Hussain Ahmad was portrayed as a daring iconoclast demolishing the twin demons of political corruption and secularism while at the same time mounting relentless attacks on American imperialism. The PIF rhetoric also voiced the grievances the cause of the downtrodden. The Jamaat leadership considered the PPP and the PML as distrustful and supporting any of them would disfigure the

public image of the Jamaat. Though winning the seats was important, yet party's public image was in no way to be compromised.²¹

Performance in 1993 Election

In 1993, Islamic Front contested the election by forging coalition with like-

Parties		Votes
PML-N		7980229
PPP		7578635
PML-J		781652
PIF		650278

minded groups and organizations, for the first time since 1970. Major contest took place between two evils, as called by Jamaat, and the PIF got 2.4% of the popular votes as compared with 38.2% votes for the PPP and 39.7% for the PML. In this way the Jamaat's vote withered more than half as compared to election 1977 vote bank. Qazi Hussain Ahmad with his revolutionary leadership failed to attract voters and his anti USA had no appeal for masses. Likewise, his anti-feudal stance infuriated the feudal supporters of PML-N to hit hard on Jamaat.²²

Votes Bagged by Parties in Election 1993

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Independent		1482012
Others		1552764
All		20025570

Though PIF had secured fourth position in terms of bagging the votes, its position, looking comparing on grounds of votes of all major parties, was not so remarkable. PPP and PML-N both collectively bagged 78 percent votes. If joined with other parties and PML-J the anti Jamaat votes to the political parties had been raised to the 90 percent. Jamaat's backed PIF could only bag 3 % of the votes. This was less than the percentage of votes that Jamaat bagged in 1970 in West Pakistan. Most number of votes were shared by PPP (38%) and PML-N (40%).

In post 1993 election scenario, the defeat in the elections led to the discrediting of Qazi Hussain Ahmad as the Ameer of Jamaat. The group of critics argued that lack of well thought out and research oriented programme led to the poor electoral performance. Following the elections, Jamaat revisited the causes of its defeat and concluded that the electoral system was designed in such a way as it favored the capitalists and feudal. Thus, Jamaat planned to make a plea to reform the electoral system, rather than focusing on its internal restructuring and reformation. Resultantly, Jamaat made itself weaker in the electoral field.

Election 2013

In 2013 General Elections, Jamaat contested the election having scale as electoral symbol. The party won three seats in National Assembly. It bagged seats from NA 28 Bunair, NA 33 Upper Dir-cum-Lower Dir and NA 34 Lower Dir. Sher Akbar Khan (NA 28), Sahibzada Tariq Ullah (NA 33) and Sahibzada Muhammad Yaqoob (NA 34) were the elected members of National Assembly. Aisha from Swat was elected MNA from Jamaat's ticket, winning the seat reserved for women.²³ It was in 1970, 1993 and 2013 that the party contested the elections without making an alliance. Jamaat could not translate its popular public image into reality through power of ballot in the elections.

Boycott of Elections

Jamaat-e-Islami's boycott of elections strategy invited the discussion whether Jamaat was returning to which Lawrence Ziring indicates while he maintains that Jamaat never held the view that it could achieve its objectives through the electoral process. Therefore, ignoring full attention to the electoral struggle Jamaat's leaders were content with creation of an organic organization.²⁴ For Jamaat the absence from the electoral scenario might be taken as the escape from the tool of election and surrender to the point of view of those in Jamaat as well as external observers, that the nature of Jamaat's work is not an electoral one.

Boycott of 1997 Elections:

After the ouster of Benazir Bhutto government on the Presidential Order, the elections in 1997 were won by Pakistan Muslim League. Jamaat decided to boycott the 1997 elections. The party demanded accountability and supported reforms within political parties prior to new elections.²⁵ Jamaat was the largest of the parties, which had decided not to participate in the elections. Qazi Hussain Ahmad and leaders of the Jamaat tried to convince the people through speeches urging them to boycott the elections. They conveyed their viewpoint that holding the elections without calling into account the "plunderers of the national exchequer" would be a futile exercise.²⁶

The PML (N), leading party, secured 137 seats in the National Assembly. The PPP bagged eighty seats. PML-N's candidates returned from most of the seats from where Jamaat's candidates had been returned traditionally. Jamaat saw the victory of PML-N in 1997 as the continuation of corrupt system. The absence from the electoral scene undermined the exploits of Jamaat that it had made during 1993 campaign. It also led to discrediting of Jamaat in the form of damage to its electoral fighting machinery because of its full focus on agitation and neglect of reforming whatever election contesting machinery the party had built. To the boasting stock of Jamaat, the changed aspect of the election was that they registered the lowest voter turnout in the electoral history of Pakistan. Jamaat claimed that the low turnout was because

of the boycott. This was evident that Jamaat was successful in convincing the people not to vote. Moreover, the plea of PML-N that they had secured a big “mandate” was untrue. The PML-N bagged 16.32 percent of the registered votes that marked general dislike of people with the country’s political system.²⁷ This claim was valid. The turnout of elections since 1985 showed clear decline in 1997.

Table of Turnout in Elections 1985 to 1997

Year	National Assembly%	Provincial Assembly
1985	53.69	57.37
1988	43.07	43.20
1990	45.46	46.10
1993	40.32	42.76
1997	35.99	35.69

Source: Election Commission of Pakistan, 1997 General Elections Report, Volume (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1997), 195.

However, despite giving support to the narrative of Jamaat to reform the electoral system the low turnout enhanced the misunderstood concept of the success to Jamaat. The party failed to understand that it had lost its constituency, its electoral support, its machinery and capacity to reach the voters and its presence in the face of other electoral players. Only Qazi and Jamaat as third option was virtually absent in the electoral field when the seekers of third force went to the polling stations. Some other party was there to claim the same position.

Boycott of Elections 2008:

The election time came in 2008 when Pakistan was facing a judicial crisis after President Musharraf’s inept dismissal of Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Chaudhry. The boycott of elections by Jamaat itself was considered a

way to reform the democratic system. It was argued that free and fair election will transform the democratic system in Pakistan. However, when change through elections has been made impossible, the pressure of public opinion to remove oppressors could be exerted through other ways.²⁸

Qazi Hussain Ahmad tried to convince other parties to boycott the elections but of no avail. Jamaat along with APDM campaigned to boycott the election. Jamaat saw three developments that Pervez Musharraf needed for the continuity of his government; the subjugation of judiciary, friendly assemblies after engineered elections, and the continued support of the USA. To counter this Jamaat suggested firstly reinstating the deposed judiciary that would restore the constitution and particularly annul the steps of Musharraf taken from 3 November to 15 December 2007. Secondly, the free and fair elections under the impartial provisional government and free, powerful and trustworthy Election Commission should be held in such a way that voters' lists and polling stations must be revised. Thirdly, the prevention of intervention of external forces especially in the internal affairs of Pakistan should be ensured. These ends could not be achieved through elections as all surveys showed that there was no possibility of fair elections, therefore, boycott was considered the only course for the participation in politics.²⁹

In Jamaat there was the opinion that the boycott will result in losing the constituencies where JI had won previously. Dir, Buner, Swat, Chitral and Malakand Agency were the areas where JI had considerable vote bank. The workers of these areas opined that boycott of the elections will lead to discrediting of JI and victory of opponents as the party was in winning position in these areas.³⁰

The Jamaat's decision to boycott the elections 2008 was due to neither fear of backlash of its performance as a coalition partner of MMA in government and opposition from 2002 to 2007 nor the prospects of Jamaat for its victory in the 2008 elections. The Jamaat was in a position to win the election by making alliance with other parties. However, it had to boycott the elections due to its continuous mistrust on Musharraf regime regarding

elections. Other motive was Jamaat's strong principled commitment with the movement against Musharraf's dictatorship. The belief of Jamaat that its stance to boycott the elections would be backed by all democratic parties lead it to take this firm stance. The decision, however, proved counterproductive, as it did not result in strengthening the position of Jamaat.

Electoral Politics of Alliance

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced for holding of elections in the first week of March 1977. The Jamaat formed an alliance of nine parties, named the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The coalition adopted an Islamic orientated programme viz the 'System of the Prophet Muhammad' (Nizam-i-Mustafa), which worked to the advantage of the religious parties like Jamaat. The PNA gave Jamaat thirty-two national seats and eighty provincial seats. The Jamaat took the possibility of electoral success seriously. It sought to attract the Shia electorates also for the goal of undermining the alliance between PPP and the Shia community. Mian Tufail Muhammad, Ameer of the Jamaat, himself spoke to a number of Shia leaders in the run-up to the polls.³¹ Jamaat won 9 (25% of the opposition alliance's total of 36 constituencies). Jamaat performed fairly well, against expectations. Modudi's party was heading for the most successful electoral results in its history, leading the opposition alliance on the way. The influence of Jamaat, after the elections, increased to such an extent that some observers remarked that the Jamaat could have performed better if the elections were held in October 1977.³²

Table of Seats and Votes of Jamaat-e-Islami in March 1977 Elections

	Punjab	Sindh	KPK (NWFP)	Total
Seats contested	20	6	5	31
Seats won	2	4	3	9
Votes for Jamaat	789743	290411	133362	1213516
Seats Won by alliance	8	11	17	36

(PNA)				
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Election Bureau of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan in Mansoor³³

In the elections of 1988 Jamaat-e-Islami allied with nine parties alliance, called Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). Pakistan Peoples' Party emerged as the largest party with 93 out of 204 National Assembly seats. IJI was able to win 54 seats. There was mismanagement in the distribution of the tickets of IJI. Except Jamaat, no party was organized and committed to the programme. Jamaat ran canvassing in the ambit of its rules and regulations. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the newly elected chief of Jamaat, was greeted with honour and respect. Even the workers of PPP also paid respect to him.³⁴

In election 1990, Jamaat once again participated as a component of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, (IJI). The coalition, mainly owing to influence of Jamaat, espoused adherence to Islam and favoured a closer relationship for Pakistan with the rest of the Muslim World. This time IJI emerged as the largest party. Jamaat's alliance became the ruling party in Centre as well as the largest in the province of Punjab. It bagged 106 seats and second ranking alliance, Peoples' Democratic Alliance got, 44 seats. Jamaat won eight seats.³⁵

In the 2002 elections, JI made an alliance with religious parties. The alliance came into existence and it was named as Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The Alliance included Jamaat-e-Islami, and major religio-political parties.³⁶ Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Ameer of Jamaat, was the MMA's president while JUI's chief, Molana Fazal-ur-Rehman was its Secretary General. As a result of the election, MMA emerged as the third largest party in center and the largest party to form government in NWFP. The alliance had also won many seats in Baluchistan. Talking about the benefits of alliance, in an interview, Qazi Hussain Ahmad said that: "all the partners have benefited from the alliance and no one would leave it."

The MMA was a fascinating example of the complexity of Pakistan's religious politics. It brought together a diverse group of actors with markedly different religious traditions, from the austere modernism of the JI to the more traditionalist Barelvi practices of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan and even the Shiism of the Islami Tehrik Pakistan.³⁷ The leaders of all six parties of the

alliance planned their election trips throughout the country. The white flag with Allah-o-Akbar written on it waved throughout Pakistan. The religious fervor and zeal was induced in the voters to participate not only in the campaign but also to vote for MMA. Jamaat analyzed that if all workers and voters of MMA cast their votes and make the turnout of 60 or 70% possible there might be Islamic Revolution through vote.³⁸

The MMA captured 53 of the National Assembly seats; the PPPP had secured 62, and the PML (Q) led the way with 76. The provincial results saw the MMA securing 48 out of 99 seats in the Frontier Assembly. MMA bagged 3335,643 out of total 29236687 polled votes. It was at fourth position in terms of votes. In KPK and Balochistan, it stood at the top regarding the share of votes and in Punjab and Sindh it was on the position down of 3rd number.

The success of MMA in NWFP during the election 2002 was due to two main reasons. One was that the regional parties and independents lost the votes. Second was that the rightist vote was consolidated under the banner of MMA. In NWFP, MMA won because according to the views of a leader of Jamaat in Punjab there is no freedom to cast vote. In Punjab, the thana culture and feudalism is stronger.³⁹

As these results indicate, the MMA was strongest in the rural frontier regions of Pakistan that bordered Afghanistan, where anti-Western sentiment was considerably stronger and residents had a direct connection to the Afghan war. Its relative success was likely owing to the coalition's effectiveness in playing on anti-American sentiment in Pakistan (particularly among the Pashtun population of the northwest), for feelings were running high a year after the American invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan.⁴⁰ The MMA decried the presence of American bases in Pakistan for the war on terrorism. It also condemned the bombing of innocent Pushtuns in Afghanistan during the conflict with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which led to rise in a considerable vote bank.

Religious and social sentiments of the people as per sociological theory could be used to woo the anti-imperial Baloch and Pahstun voters by the MMA as

religious parties in Pakistan had been the only political grouping that had been consistently anti-Western, anti-American and anti-imperialist actively and in an organised way since at least the Gulf war of 1991. They had been pro-Islamic and hence, against most things that constitute the 'West' their anti-Americanism had been contradictory to the US's policy particularly in Palestine and other Muslim areas.⁴¹

The Anti-USA stance, that had been vocally adopted by Jamaat since 1990s, now in the wake of USA-led war on terror in Afghanistan, according to Michigan theory, brought the Pushtun populace near MMA. The people turned to Islamist parties and anti-USA slogan gained much popularity for MMA. Based on this stance Jamaat alone could have gathered electoral support neither in 2002 elections nor before and after those elections. The record of Jamaat's alliance with the USA against USSR in Afghanistan could be a doubt. Moreover, the sentiment against USA at a specific point of time was concentrated in support of MMA that could not be collected by Jamaat alone.

The election 2002 brought forward four important findings. They clearly indicated that the Jamaat alone was not in a position to get remarkable electoral victory. It could get partial success in the elections only through making an alliance with the like-minded and religious groups. It did not have electoral space in big provinces of Punjab and Sindh even with the assistance of allied groups.

The military junta's impact on the electoral performance of Jamaat was also significant in many ways. By devising rules through electoral reforms that proved favourable for Jamaat and its allies, military regime was helpful in victory of MMA. Likewise, the arrest and restrictions on the leadership of Jamaat and its allies seemed to be helpful for success of Jamaat.

Jamaat and its allies in the MMA, according to the rules of sociological theory, got success in NWFP and Balochistan with the help of the support of social, religious and political groups that turned acquainted and associated to the Jamaat due to international and national conditions. The Pashtun and Islam loving groups were victimized during USA's invasion of Afghanistan.

The participants of the religious and Pashtun segments in Pakistan expressed sympathies with these groups who were attracted by the Jamaat and its allies. Jamaat and its allies also succeeded in getting the support of pro-democracy elements in the vacuum of political leadership caused by absence of main political leadership of country.

Conclusion

To conclude this study Jamaat-e-Islami has been in the electoral practice since the elections were held in Pakistan for the first time. Jamaat meanwhile boycotted two elections; one in 1997 and other in 2008. Although in both elections Jamaat could boast of low turnout on its appeal but lost was too much, it had lost its constituency, its supporters in the electorates, its machinery and capacity to reach the electorate and its presence in the face of other electoral players. In the elections of 1951, 1964-65, 1977, 1988, 1990 and 2002 it participated in the elections as an ally with other political parties. During alliances Jamaat sometimes could be able to share power but lost its individual identity because Jamaat contested elections on some other electoral symbols. It was in 1970, 1993 and 2013 that the party contested the elections as a single party without making an alliance with other parties. In 1970 and 2013 Jamaat contested election on its own electoral symbol of scale and maintained its identity but could not show good results. In all, Jamaat could not demonstrate good following of voters in most of the elections. However, in some elections it succeeded to get its candidates won considerable seats that made the party exert its position in forming the government.

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